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On the Continued Need for H-1B Reform: A Partial, 
Statutory Suggestion to Protect Foreign and U.S. 
Workers 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
During the summer of 2006, the nation was abuzz with talk of 
immigration reform. From Congress to Calexico,1 talk of amnesty2 and 
anti-terrorism,3 green cards and orange cards,4 minute men5 and “mini-
Ellis Islands”6 filled both backyard summer barbecues and news reports. 
Emotions and rhetoric ran high. It seemed as though everyone had an 
opinion, but no one could agree on a solution. 
Although much of the discussion focused on illegal immigration, or 
more specifically, illegal immigration at the United States-Mexico 
border, beneath the surface another debate continued to develop. The 
legal entry of high-skilled foreign workers into the United States, though 
neglected by media reports, also divided the nation.7
 1. See Linda Hales, At the Borders, Creative Crossings, WASH. POST, July 29, 2006, at C01 
(discussing the architecture at the port of the famed town); see also U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection Offers Tips for Summer Border Travel, US FED NEWS, July 27, 2006 (offering tips for 
legal border crossings at the border town). 
 2. See Tamar Jacoby, Amnesty is Not a Four-Letter Word, L.A. TIMES, July 29, 2006, at 
B17. 
 3. See Tim Jones, Canadians Also Paying Price of 9/11 Security, CHI. TRIB., May 24, 2006, 
at C1. 
 4. On May 22, 2006, Senator Diane Feinstein (D-CA) proposed an amendment to the Senate 
Comprehensive Immigration Reform Bill which provided for the development of an “orange card.” 
152 Cong. Rec. S. 4849, 4851–60 (2006). The orange card, an obvious reference to the green card, 
was to be a biometric identification card given to undocumented immigrants who paid taxes and 
passed background checks. Id. at 4852.The orange card would be a step towards the eventual goal of 
obtaining a green card. Id. The amendment to the bill ultimately failed the next day by a largely 
partisan vote of 37-61. 152 Cong. Rec. S. 4924, 4936 (2006). 
 5. See Michael Stetz, Border Marchers, Minutemen Swap Verbal Jabs, SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRIB., June 4, 2006, at B2. 
 6. Speaking from the Conservative think tank, the Heritage Foundation, Representative 
Mike Pence (R-Ind.) proposed what he viewed as a middle ground between amnesty and deportation 
with an innovative market twist. The plan intended to encourage self-deportation by establishing 
privately run worker placement agencies outside of the country. He labeled these agencies “Ellis 
Island Centers.” The Representative claimed that through these centers, people could be back in the 
country working in a week or less. He envisioned employers helping undocumented workers prepare 
for registration at these centers. At these “mini-Ellis Islands,” people were to be fingerprinted, 
screened and then issued “W-visas.” See Mike Pence, R-Ind., U.S. House of Rep., Border Security 
and Immigration: Building a Principled Consensus for Reform, Address, (May 23, 2006) in 
HERITAGE LECTURES, June 2, 2006, at 4. 
 7. See S. Mitra Kalita, Most See Visa Program as Severely Flawed, WASH. POST, Mar. 31, 
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Every year the United States grants thousands of H-1B visas, which 
admit foreign workers into the country to perform specialty occupations 
vital to the national economy.8 Determining whether to expand the H-1B 
program to admit more workers is a topic of heated debate. Those in 
favor of the program say it keeps the United States competitive in a 
global economy, that it admits “the world’s best and brightest,”9 and that 
it is necessary to make up for labor shortages in the nation’s technical 
and scientific workforce.10 Those opposed to the program question the 
extent of the labor shortage11 and contend that the system also costs 
Americans thousands of jobs as companies use the program as a source 
of cheap labor.12 Advocates from both sides have staked out seemingly 
irreconcilable positions on the matter. Major business leaders, such as a 
Bill Gates and Scott McNealy, the head of Sun Microsystems,13 have 
courted Congress and called for an expansion of the program, warning 
the nation of the need to bring great minds to America. Labor unions14 
and minority-rights groups15 have expressed concerns about the effects of 
the system on American jobs. Even gay rights advocates have called for 
reform of the system.16
2006, at D01(“Somewhere in the debate over immigration and the future of illegal workers, another, 
less-publicized fight is being waged over those who toil in air-conditioned offices, earn up to six-
figure salaries and spend their days programming and punching code.”); Deborah Rothberg, H-1B 
Increase Quietly Passes First Hurdle, EWEEK.COM, May 31, 2006, http://www.eweek.com/ 
article2/0,1759,1969617,00.asp. 
 8. See e.g., Carolyn Lochhead, Immigration Bill Would Add Visas for Tech Workers, S.F. 
CHRON., A1 (March 10, 2006) (discussing the number of workers admitted to the U.S. under the H-
1B program); see also infra Part II. 
 9. Lilia Rissman, Letter to the Editor, Legal Immigrants, CHI. TRIB., June 5, 2006, at 18 
(“[N]ew immigration laws should also ensure that the U.S. will continue to attract the world’s best 
and brightest.”); see also Senator John Cornyn, Editorial, Bring Best and Brightest, San Antonio 
Express-News, July 18, 2006, at 6B (emphasizing the importance of attracting “the best and 
brightest individuals to work here in the U.S. and to ensure that these talented workers and their jobs 
stay here in the U.S.”). 
 10. John Carroll, Why We Need H-1B Professionals, ZDNet, Feb. 3, 2003, 
http://news.zdnet.com/2100-9595_22-983066.html; see also Rissman, supra note 9. 
 11. See infra note 33. 
 12. See Paul Donnelly, H-1B is Just Another Government Subsidy, COMPUTERWORLD, July 
22, 2002, www.computerworld/com/careertopics.careers.recruiting/story/0,10801,72848,00.html; 
Sharon Gaudin, Are H-1B Visas a Cog in the Offshoring Machine? IT MGMT., Apr. 14, 2006, 
http://itmanagement.earthweb.com/career/article.php/3599141. 
 13. Alan Murray, High-Tech Titans Unite on Lifting Visa Caps, WALL ST. J., June 14, 2006, 
at A2. 
 14. See, e.g., AFL-CIO Executive Council, Reform the H-1B and L-1 Guest Worker Visa 
Programs, Aug. 6, 2003, available at http://aflcio.org/aboutus/thisistheaflcio/ecouncil/ec08062003e. 
cfm. 
 15. Carrie Kirby, On the Sidelines: H-1B Leaves Minority Workers on Sidelines, Groups Say, 
S.F. CHRON., Oct. 19, 2000, at B1. 
 16. See Susan Laurel Hodges, Left Out by the Legal Route In, WASH. POST, June 12, 2006, at 
A21 (calling for increase in H-1B visa cap so that it will be easier for the author’s partner to enter the 
country, as they cannot legally marry). 
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Questions as to whether there is truly a high-tech labor shortage or 
whether businesses are merely looking to avoid training and 
compensation costs are difficult to answer.17 As has been rightly pointed 
out, “this has largely been a controversy with much noise and relatively 
little light.”18 What is certain is that the current system is flawed.19 
Numbers aside, abuse of the H-1B system is evident from applications 
approved for a broad range of non-technical occupations including: 
accountants, newspaper reporters, dance instructors, restaurant hostesses, 
and nannies.20
Much of the contention centers around the number of visas issued 
each year: an economic debate about whether an influx of immigrants 
will hurt or benefit the U.S.21 This Article attempts to avoid adopting a 
position on either side of the numbers question, and instead focuses on 
improving the current system so that it functions as intended, balancing 
what has been described as the “fundamental tension” underlying the 
U.S. immigration debate, namely “an immigration policy that facilitates 
the employment of non-citizen workers by U.S. employers and seeks to 
protect U.S. labor from competition by non-citizen workers.”22 Fraud and 
corruption in this program is troubling as any future guest-worker 
 17. Indeed, such questions may even be unanswerable. See Roger Waldinger and Christopher 
L. Erickson, Temporarily Foreign? The Labor Market for Migrant Professionals in High-Tech at the 
Peak of the Boom, 24 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 463, 465 (2003). 
 18. Id. at 464. 
 19. Kalita, supra note 7 , at D01 (“[U]nderlying the [H-1B debate] is a belief, even among 
the workers themselves, that the current H-1B program is severely flawed.”); see also Note, Looking 
to the North While Playing Doctor: Solving the H-1B Visa Problem by Following Canada’s Lead, 10 
Minn. J. Global Trade 433, 446 (2001) [hereinafter Looking to the North] (“The United States 
Congress is painfully aware that it is impossible to please everyone all of the time; however, it is 
difficult to find even one soul who lauds the H-1B legislation. . . .”) (citing Lisa Vaas, What H-1B 
Bill Will Come Out Ahead?, EWEEK, Sept. 18, 2000, at 28). 
 20. Testimony of John Miano Before the Subcomm. on Immigr., Border Security, and Claims, 
H. Judiciary Comm., 109th Cong. 7 (2006) (statement of John Miano, Former President, 
Programmers Guild); available at http://judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/miano033006.pdf 
[hereinafter Miano 2006]. The government makes Labor Condition Applications available to the 
public. Id. 
 21. See George Newman, Editorial, A Plea for Sanity in the Immigration Debate, ST. LOUIS 
POST-DISPATCH, Aug. 21, 2006, at B9. In this editorial, an immigration attorney mentions two 
studies by prominent scholars reaching opposite conclusions: “George Borjas of the John F. 
Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University argues persuasively that the large influx of 
workers will seriously damage the U.S. economy. David Card at the University of California at 
Berkeley argues just as persuasively that it will be enormously beneficial.” Id. For a discussion of 
the complexity surrounding the economic debate see Roger Lowenstein, The Immigration Equation, 
NY TIMES MAGAZINE, July 9, 2006, at 36. 
 22. Enid Trucios-Haynes, Temporary Workers and Future Immigration Policy Conflicts: 
Protecting U.S. Workers and Satisfying the Demand for Global Human Capital, 40 BRANDEIS L.J. 
967, 968 (2002). Alternatively, this can also be seen as “the tension between the desire of U.S. 
employers FOR foreign labor and the wish of the U.S. government to protect the interests of U.S. 
workers.” Carl Falstrom, Swimming in the International Labor Pool: What Employers Need to Know 
About Recent Changes to the H1-B Program, 27 S.F. ATT’Y 31, 33 (2001). 
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program will likely reflect the current legislative scheme.23
Part II of this Article provides an overview of the H-1B program, the 
system designed by Congress to bring foreign workers into the United 
States temporarily. Part III presents views from both sides of the debate 
in order to provide a context for the proposed solution and illuminate the 
flaws and controversy within the current system. Although H-1B visa 
holders work in a broad range of careers,24 this Article focuses on 
computer programmers, as this newly-unionized group has recently made 
lobbying efforts 25 and the computer industry receives about one-third of 
the H-1B visas issued each year.26 This section highlights one of the 
unforeseen flaws of the present H-1B visa system, “bodyshopping,” the 
name given to the practice whereby companies bring H-1B visa workers 
into the country and then contract the workers out to other companies on 
a work-for-hire basis, in an attempt to avoid statutory wage 
requirements.27 Part IV advocates a statutory amendment to eliminate 
bodyshopping, a change already enacted in a similar visa program and 
welcomed by labor advocates. Some might say that changing the system 
in this fashion would limit foreign workers’ mobility and subject them to 
increased abuse at the hands of employers, thereby discouraging “the 
world’s best and brightest” from working in America. Part V responds to 
such potential critics by demonstrating the protections that already exist 
for foreign workers within the current system. Part VI offers a brief 
conclusion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 23. As one congressional Representative stated, any guest-worker program developed in the 
future will be based on flawed systems such as the H-1B program. Statement of Congressman Issa, 
Before the H. Subcomm. On Immigr., “Is the Department of Labor doing enough to protect U.S. 
workers?” (June 22, 2006) (based on notes in author’s possession). 
 24. See supra note 20. 
 25. These efforts can be seen in the testimony of John Miano, infra Part III. 
 26. Sarah Ryley, Thousands of Skilled Professionals from Overseas Work for Less Money in 
Positions Americans Want, Critics Say, DETROIT NEWS, September 30, 2006, at 1B (“31 percent of 
H-1B visa holders work in computer-related fields.”). According to Norm Matloff, “the vast majority 
of H-1Bs in high-tech positions are computer programmers. . . .” Norm Matloff, On the Need for 
Reform of the H-1B Non-immigrant Work Visa in Computer-related Occupations, 36 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 815, 831 (2003), available at http://heather.cs.ucdavis.edu/Mich.pdf. Matloff relates that 
the label “programmer” is rarely used in Silicon Valley, and that in the software and hardware 
industries, programmers are often referred to as “software engineers.” Id. at 831–32. 
 27. The practice has also been referred to as “job shopping” or “benching,” but the latter is 
actually a description of one aspect of the process. See infra notes 113–14 and accompanying text. 
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II. OVERVIEW 
 
This section briefly introduces the H-1B visa by providing an 
overview of the program and the application process. An explanation of 
the basic statutory scheme is necessary for understanding the problems 
with the current system and the solution proposed by this Article. 
 
A. H-1B Overview28
 
The H-1B program was established by the Immigration Act of 1990 
to allow nonimmigrant aliens29 to work in specialty occupations30 in the 
United States for up to six years.31 Although an H-1B visa does not 
directly result in legal permanent residence, visa holders may apply for 
permanent residency through employer sponsorships.32 H-1B applicants 
do not need to show that they intend to remain in the country beyond 
those six years.33
Currently, the yearly cap on H-1B visas is 65,000.34 In response to 
industry claims of a technology labor shortage,35 Congress raised the 
limit to 115,000 during 1999-2000 and to 195,000 during 2001-2003, but 
 28. For a somewhat dated, but more extensive review of the H-1B program, see Brian John 
Halliday, In Order to Hire the Best Person for the Job, We Have to do What? A Look at the H-1B 
Visa Program: The Short-term Solution for Continued American Competitiveness in the Global 
High-Technology Marketplace, 11 U. FLA. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 33, 35–48 (1999). 
 29. For a definition of nonimmigrant see 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15) (2000). 
 30. A specialty occupation is one that “requires theoretical and practical application of a 
body of highly specialized knowledge and . . . attainment of a bachelor’s or higher degree or its 
equivalent.” 8 U.S.C. § 1184(i)(1)(A) (2000). U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) 
offers the following as examples of specialty occupations: “architecture, engineering, mathematics, 
physical sciences, social sciences, medicine and health, education, business specialties, accounting, 
law, theology, and the arts.” USCIS, H-1B Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.uscis.gov/ 
graphics/howdoi/h1b.htm (last visited June 19, 2006) [hereinafter FAQ]. 
 31. After that time, an alien must remain outside of the country for one year before he/she 
can be approved again. FAQ, supra note 30. 
 32. Although the U.S. Government allots 140,000 employment-based green cards annually, 
many of these go unused due to the backlog that plagues the immigration system. See David C. 
Yang, Globalization and the Transnational Asian “Knowledge Class,” 12 ASIAN L.J. 137, 147 
(2005) 
 33. See Susan Montalvo-Gesser, Unilateral Versus Multilateral Approach to Labor 
Migration: Search for an Adequate Way of Negotiating Foreign Workers’ & Domestic Employers’ 
Interests and National Economic Vitality, 43 BRANDEIS L.J. 261, 265 (2004) (“The H-1B visa allows 
a six-year residence in the United States without requiring a foreign professional to demonstrate 
against the presumption that they intend to permanently immigrate to the United States.” ) (citing 
Demetrios G. Papademetriou, The Shifting Expectations of Free Trade and Migration in NAFTA’s 
Promise and Reality: Lessons from Mexico for the Hemisphere 39, 42 (2003)). 
 34. 8 U.S.C. § 1184(g)(1)(A)(i) (2000). 
 35. Matloff, supra note 20, at 816. Matloff presents several studies that question the validity 
of claims to a shortage. Id. at 833–45. 
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the limit returned to 65,000 in 2004.36 Additionally, 20,000 visas go to 
those with graduate degrees from U.S. institutions and there are no limits 
on the number of visas issued to universities and research institutions.37
The recently passed Senate Comprehensive Immigration Reform 
Bill,38 currently awaiting conference committee negotiations with the 
House,39 proposes to raise the current H-1B cap.40 Much of the attention 
this past summer focused on undocumented immigration,41 and it is 
uncertain whether the proposed increases to the H-1B cap will survive 
negotiations.42
The demand for H-1B visas is great. The quota for the visas was 
exhausted on the first day of fiscal year 2005, and in 2006, the quota was 
exhausted six weeks prior to the start of the fiscal year.43 This year, U.S. 
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) announced that the quota 
for fiscal year 2007 was met on May 26, 2006.44
 36. See 8 U.S.C. § 1184(g)(1)(A) (2000). Pending legislation could allow for 115,000 with an 
automatic twenty percent increase each year the cap is met. See infra note 41. 
 37. 8 U.S.C. §1184(g)(5)(c); see also Testimony to the U.S. H. Judiciary Comm., Subcomm. 
on Immigr. and Claims, 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of John M. Miano, President, Programmers 
Guild), available at http://www.colosseumbuilders.com/articles/miano_testimony.html [hereinafter 
Miano 1999]. Within the 65,000 visas, 6,800 visas are reserved for Singapore and Chile under free 
trade agreements. Id. 
 38. Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006, S. 2611, 109th Cong. (2006). 
 39. Last year, the House prepared two bills proposing to close some of the loopholes 
discussed below. However, neither the Defend the American Dream Act of 2005, H.R. 4378, 109th 
Cong. (2005), nor the USA Jobs Protection Act of 2005, H.R. 3322, 109th Cong. (2005), has made it 
beyond the House Judiciary Committee. The bills sought to “increase the monitoring and 
enforcement authority of the Secretary of Labor,” eliminate bodyshopping (for a description of 
bodyshopping, see infra Part III.B.3), and create a private right of action for individuals adversely 
affected by the hiring of an H-1B worker. It remains to be seen whether any aspects of these two 
pieces of legislation will resurface during the upcoming committee negotiations. 
 40. The bill proposes to increase the annual cap from 65,000 to 115,000. Each year the cap is 
met, the subsequent year’s cap will increase to 120 percent of the previous year’s total. See id. This 
means if 115,000 visas are issued during the first year after the law is passed, 138,000 will be 
allowed during the next. If that cap is met, the following year would allow 165,600 and so forth. 
 41. “The immigration debate swirling through Congress this summer is mostly about low-
skilled immigrants. Largely ignored are the highly skilled legal immigrants. . . .” June Kronholz, 
Under a Cloud: For Dr. Sengupta, Long-term Visa is a Long Way Off, WALL ST. J., June 27, 2006, 
at A1. Groups affected by this legislation, however, have weighed in on the matter. Microsoft’s Bill 
Gates released a statement applauding the Senate for its proposed reforms. Microsoft, Statement 
From Bill Gates on Senate Passage of Comprehensive Immigration Reform (May 25, 2006), 
http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/ press/2006/may06/05-25StatementBillPR.mspx. Labor groups 
have already spoken out against it. See, e.g., Michael Cooney, Editorial, H-1B Limits Raised, 
Controversy Ignited, NETWORK WORLD, June 5, 2006, http://www.networkworld.com/columnists 
/2006/060506editorial.html. 
 42. The House Subcommittee on Immigration did hold a hearing on the efficacy of the Labor 
Department in enforcing the aims of the H-1B program, but its effect on pending legislation cannot 
be determined at this time. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Press Release, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, USCIS Reaches H-1B Cap 
(June 1, 2006), available at http://www.uscis.gov/files/pressrelease/FY07H1Bcap_060106PR.pdf. 
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B. The Application Process45
 
Applying for an H-1B visa requires sponsorship by a U.S. employer. 
The employer must file a Labor Condition Application (LCA) affirming: 
 
• It will pay the H-1B worker at least the wages paid to other 
employees with similar experience and qualifications or the local 
prevailing wage, whichever is greater;46 
• There is no current strike or lockout in the occupational 
qualifications requested; 
• The employer will provide notice of the application filing to other 
employees or a bargaining representative.47 
 
Note that an employer does not need to certify that it has attempted to 
offer the position to workers already in the United States or that hiring an 
H-1B worker will not displace any U.S. workers. In contrast, if an 
employer is H-1B dependent,48 the employer must also attest: 
 
• It will not “displace any similarly employed U.S. worker within the 
period beginning 90 days before and ending 90 days after the date of 
petition filing;” 
• It will not “place any H-1B worker with any other employer or at 
another employer’s worksite unless first making a good faith inquiry of 
the employer at the secondary worksite and obtaining assurances that 
the other employer will not displace a U.S. worker within 90 days 
before or after placement of the H-1B worker;” 
• It will “[t]ake good faith steps to recruit a U.S. worker for the 
 45. For a practitioner’s overview of the process see generally, John F. Koryto & Michael E. 
Stroster, Business/Employment Law: Get into the Game: Hiring the Best from Around the Globe 
Isn’t Just for Playing Field, 84 MICH. B. J. 26 (2005). 
 46. Regulations allow employers to select a prevailing wage from a number of different 
sources as long as it is “calculated consistent with recognized industry standards.” U.S. Department 
of Labor, Fact Sheet #59: Changes Made By the H-1B Visa Reform Act of 2004, 
http://www.dol.gov/esa/regs/ compliance/whd/whdfs59.htm (Last visited June 19, 2006) [hereinafter 
Fact Sheet]. Department of Labor wage surveys are available for prevailing wage purposes and 
include four levels based on experience, education, and level of supervision. Id. 
 47. U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration, Form ETA 9035, 
available at http://workforcesecurity.doleta.gov/foreign/pdf/eta9035v50.pdf (last visited June 29, 
2006). 
 48. An employer is “H-1B dependent” if it meets one of three standards: it has more than 
fifty employees, and fifteen percent or more of its employees are H-1B visa holders; it has twenty-
six to fifty employees, and the company employs more than twelve H-1B visa holders; or it has 
twenty-five or fewer employees, and the company employs more than seven H-1B workers. 20 
C.F.R. § 655.736(a)(1) (2006). 
    
160 BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 21 
 
position for which the H-1B worker is sought and offer the job to any 
U.S. worker who applies for the job and is equally or better 
qualified.”49 
 
The employer must then file the certified LCA along with a Form I-
129 petition (Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker) and a fee to USCIS, 
after which the alien may apply for the H-1B visa.50 Thus the worker is 
dependent on a U.S. employer to enter and remain in the country. The 
entire application process generally lasts several months.51
Although Congress designed the system with a goal of protecting the 
interests of U.S. workers, the LCA process remained flawed. Prior to 
fiscal year 2006, the law only allowed the Department of Labor to ensure 
the Labor Condition Application form had been filled out correctly.52 
Now, the Department of Labor may investigate the contents of an LCA: 
 
[W]hen the Secretary of Labor personally certifies that there is 
reasonable cause to believe that the employer is not in compliance . . . 
or when a credible source provides information that includes 
allegations that within the past [twelve] months an employer has 
willfully failed to meet an LCA condition, has engaged in a pattern or 
practice of violations or has committed a substantial failure to meet an 
LCA condition that affects multiple employees.53
 49. See Fact Sheet, supra note 48. 
 50. See 20 C.F.R. § 655.700 (2006); FAQ, supra note 30. 
 51. For estimates of the length of time required for H-1B applications, see Adam Green, 
Frequently Asked Questions, Law Offices of Adam Green, http://www.employment-
familysponsoredimmigration.com/faq.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2006)(two to three months); 
University of Michigan International Center, Employment Information, 
http://www.umich.edu/~icenter/ intlstudents/employ/H1-BFAQ.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2006) 
(three to six months); University of Tennessee, How LONG Does It Take to Process an H-1B 
Application? http://web.utk.edu/~globe/iss/forms/h1processingtimes.pdf (last visited Oct. 5, 2006) 
(Two to nine months, depending on immigration status of the applicant); Hunton & Williams, The 
New Fiscal Year Begins October 1, 2004: How Long Will H-1B Visas Last?, BUS. IMMIG. ALERT 
(Aug. 2004), available at http://www.hunton.com/files/tbl_s47Details/FileUpload265/738/Business_ 
Immigration_Alert_H-1B_CAP.pdf (Applications can be filed, at the earliest, six months before a 
job’s start date). 
 52. See John Miano, The Bottom of the Pay Scale: Wages for H-1B Computer Programmers 
(Center for Immigr. Stud., D.C.), Dec. 2005, available at http://www.cis.org/articles/2005/back1305 
.pdf [hereinafter CIS]; Fact Sheet, supra note 48. 
 53. See Fact Sheet, supra note 48. Additionally, under the American Competitiveness and 
Workforce Improvement Act of 1998 (ACWIA), the Office of Special Counsel (OSC) in the Civil 
Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice is responsible for handling “failure to select” 
charges, where aggrieved parties may file complaints against employers for “seek[ing] to hire an H-
1B visa holder over an equally or better qualified U.S. worker.” Statement of Juan Carlos Benitez 
Before the Subcomm. on Immigr., H. Judiciary Comm. 107th Cong. 7 (2002) (statement of Juan 
Carlos Benitez, Special Counsel for Immigr. Related Unfair Employment Practices, C.R. Div., U.S. 
Dep’t of Just.); available at http://judiciary.house.gov/legacy/ benitez032102.htm. 
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Even though attempts to correct the system indicate progress towards its 
dual goals of protecting native workers and attracting foreign talent, as 
the next section demonstrates, the current scheme still contains 
noticeable and exploited flaws. 
 
III. FLAWS IN THE SYSTEM: BODYSHOPPING UNCOVERED 
 
This section explains the controversy surrounding the current system 
by presenting views from both sides of the debate. It is hoped that by 
discussing the views of three individuals who have published on the 
topic of H-1B reform, the reader will gain an enriched overview of the 
controversy. Specifically, this section will analyze the perspectives of 
John Miano, founder and current legal counsel of the Programmers 
Guild—a union for computer programmers; Stuart Anderson, director of 
the National Foundation for American Policy; and finally, Norm Matloff, 
a computer science professor and frequent writer on the H-1B program. 
The biases of each of these individuals will become quite obvious in this 
section. The pro-labor arguments of Miano provide a context for 
Anderson’s pro-immigration positions, and Matloff’s pro-labor 
responses, in turn, further develop the context for both. After briefly 
introducing these individuals, this section explores the contentions 
surrounding several of the flaws of the current system—focusing on one 
problem in particular, bodyshopping—by summarizing the writings and 
testimony before Congress of the three individuals concerning the H-1B 
program. Seeing the dialogue concerning this topic presented in one 
place will hopefully help the reader recognize the difficulty in identifying 
and remedying the problems in the current system. 
 
A. Individual Introductions 
 
John Miano worked as a computer programmer for eighteen years 
and has published several articles and books on programming.54 In 1998, 
Miano founded the Programmers Guild to represent the interests of 
American computer programmers.55 Miano has since stepped down as 
chairman of the Guild, and he now runs his own consulting agency.56 In 
 54. ,Miano 1999 supra note 38; Miano 2006, supra note 20. 
 55. Miano 1999 supra note 38. 
 56. Colosseum Builders, Inc., Company Profile, http://www.colosseumbuilders.com (last 
visited Oct. 6, 2006). Miano also has his own blog at http://johnontech.blogspot.com/. The site was 
started in January 2006 and currently only has seven brief postings that comment on various topics 
including H-1B visas. 
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2002, he enrolled in law school where he researched data on Labor 
Condition Applications for H-1B workers.57 He recently published his 
findings through the Center for Immigration Studies (CIS).58
Stuart Anderson is the Executive Director of the National Foundation 
for American Policy (NFAP).59 Anderson is recognized as the author of 
legislation which expanded the H-1B program in 1998 and 2000.60 A 
former Cato immigration specialist, Anderson also worked at the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) as Executive Associate 
Commissioner for Policy and Planning and as Counselor to the 
Commissioner from August 2001 to January 2003.61 He too has testified 
before Congress on immigration matters and recently produced a report 
establishing a general defense of the H-1B program and refuting specific 
claims of Miano’s CIS study, “H-1B Professionals and Wages: Setting 
the Record Straight.”62
 57. Miano 2006, supra note 20, at 5. 
 58. CIS, supra note 54. Many argue that the motivations of those who oppose immigration 
expansion contain powerful racial undertones, see generally e.g., Yang, supra note 33, and it should 
be mentioned that Miano has also published several articles and comments on the controversial 
immigration website VDARE.com. The site has been labeled by the Associated Press as an 
“immigration-focused Web magazine.” Laura Wides-Munoz, Spanish ‘Star-Spangled Banner’ 
Draws Ire, Apr. 27, 2006, http://www.breitbart.com/news/2006/04/27/D8H8LGDO0.html. However, 
Media Matters, a media watchdog group whose self-declared mission is “correcting conservative 
misinformation in the U.S. media,” Media Matters for America, Our Mission, Who We Are, 
http://mediamatters.org/about_us/ (last visited June 19, 2006), relates that VDARE.com “publishes 
the work of ‘white nationalists’” and points out that “the Southern Poverty Law Center added 
VDARE.com to its list of hate websites.” J.B., Associated Press Identified VDARE.com as an 
“Immigration-focused Web Magazine” – Not Noting That It Publishes “White Nationalists,” MEDIA 
MATTERS FOR AMERICA, (May 2, 2006), http://mediamatters.org/items/200605020003. Articles on 
VDARE.com include: Bryanna Bevens, How about “National Hispanic Crime Prevention 
Awareness Month”?, VDARE.COM, Sept. 29, 2004, http://www.vdare.com/bevens/ 
hispanic_month.htm and Paul Craig Roberts, White Americans: Second Class Citizens, 
VDARE.COM, Feb. 19, 2002, http://www.vdare.com/bevens/hispanic_month.htm. In addition, the 
site includes a guide on how to report illegal aliens. Juan Mann, 2006 Reporting Aliens Update, 
VDARE.com, Feb. 20, 2006, http://www.vdare.com/faq.htm. Miano’s writings include: John Miano, 
Remember 9/11 by Doing Something About Software Terrorist Threat, VDARE.COM, Sept. 10, 
2002, http://www.vdare.com/misc/miano_terrorist.htm, and Ten Principles of Immigration, 
VDARE.COM, Oct. 10, 2001, http://www.vdare.com/fulford/contest_miano.htm. 
 59. National Foundation for American Policy, Biographies, http://nfap.com/about 
biographies/ (last visited June 19, 2006). Anderson has been described as “an ideological 
libertarian,” who “despise[s] . . . computerized documentation and visa-tracking.” Nicholas 
Confessore, Borderline Insanity, WASH. MONTHLY, May 2002, available at http://washington 
monthly.com/features/2001/0205.confessore.html, cited by Norm Matloff, Stuart Anderson 
Criticizes Miano Study, H-1B/L-1/OFFSHORING E-NEWSLETTER, Mar. 14, 2006, 
http://heather.cs.ucdavis.edu/Archive/NFAP.txt [hereinafter E-NEWSLETTER]. 
 60. Matloff, supra note 26, at 865. 
 61. National Foundation for American Policy, supra note 63. 
 62. H-1B Professionals and Wages: Setting the Record Straight, NFAP POLICY BRIEF (Nat’l 
Found. for Am. Pol’y, Arlington, Va.), Mar. 2006, available at http://nfap.com/researchactivities 
/articles/NFAPPolicyBriefH1BProfessionalsAndWages0306.pdf [hereinafter NFAP BRIEF]. 
According to Miano, Anderson was contracted to respond to the CIS report. Colosseum Builders, 
Inc., Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.colosseumbuilders.com/cisfaq.htm(last visited June 
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Norm Matloff is a computer science professor at UC Davis. He has 
written frequently on high-skilled worker immigration,63 including a law 
review article published in the Michigan Journal for Law Reform.64 In 
May 2006, he produced an article for CIS on student visas.65 He has also 
testified before Congress on the H-1B visa program.66
 
B. Discussion of the Problems in the Current H-1B System 
 
1.  Problems with Labor Condition Applications. 
 
An initial hurdle in discussing H-1B reform is that LCA information 
is somewhat limited. According to John Miano, the Government makes 
detailed LCA information available, but does not provide any specific 
data for the corresponding H-1B visa.67 He alleges that under the current 
system there is no way to tell what happens after the labor certification 
process.68 Miano writes that one LCA “can be used for visa applications 
for multiple H-1B workers. . . . and there is no way to tell what the 
employer actually paid the H-1B worker.”69 Based on his research, of the 
307,779 LCAs processed during fiscal year 2005 only 848 were 
rejected.70 While examining LCAs, Miano observed evidence suggesting 
flaws in the system, including: 
 
 
20, 2006). Miano does not indicate who he suspects contracted Anderson. Id. 
 63. E.g., Norm Matloff, Best? Brightest? A Green Card Giveaway for Foreign Grads Would 
Be Unwarranted, (Center for Immigr. Stud., D.C.), May 2006, available at http://www.cis.org/ 
articles/2006/back506.html. Like Miano, Matloff has also written on VDARE.com. E.g., Norm 
Matloff, Oakland’s Bilingualism: No American Need Apply, VDARE.COM, Apr. 27, 2001, 
http://www.vdare.com/misc/matloff/oaklands_bilangualism.htm. 
 64. Matloff, supra note 26. 
 65. Norm Matloff, Best? Brightest? A Green Card Giveaway for Foreign Grads Would Be 
Unwarranted, (Center for Immigr. Stud., D.C.), May 2006, available at http://www.cis.org 
/articles/2006/back506.html. 
 66. Debunking the Myth of a Desperate Software Labor Shortage: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Immigr., H. Judiciary Comm., 105th Cong. (1998) (testimony of Norm Matloff), 
updated version available at http://heather.cs.ucdavis.edu/itaa.real.pdf. 
 67. CIS, supra note 54, at 6. 
 68. See id. 
 69. Miano 2006, supra note 20, at 6. Miano also discusses further problems that render the 
LCA process ineffective. He alleges the Federal government granted more visas than statutorily 
allowed. Id. He claims “USCIS has not produced the congressionally mandated reports on the H-1B 
program since [fiscal year] 2003.” Id. As a result, Miano asserts, “[n]o one knows how many people 
are in the U.S. on H-1B visas,” nor does anyone know “how many workers on H-1B visas remain 
illegally in the United States after their visas expire.” Id. 
 70. Miano 2006, supra note 20, at 11. Miano suggests this is because the Department of 
Labor only checks for incomplete or obviously inaccurate forms. Id. 
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• Applications made for computer programmers by businesses that do 
not normally employ programmers (e.g., stores and restaurants). 
• Employers with absurdly low salaries for programmers, especially 
those with all of their H1-B workers being paid below the 10th 
percentile [of the industry]. 
• Small companies whose number of H-1B visa requests appear to be 
more than they could possibly employ. . . . 
• Employers requesting large numbers of H-1B workers in locations 
not likely to have significant numbers of programming jobs, suggesting 
the employers are using one location for wage certification and other 
locations for the actual job site. . . . 
• The LCAs for many companies show a disregard for the formalities 
of business associations. . . . [e.g.,] limited partnerships doing business 
as “corporations” and entities that have submitted LCAs under different 
forms of organization].71 
 
Despite the difficulties associated with gathering accurate data, 
Miano’s limited findings do indicate that various forms of abuse do 
indeed occur within the current system. Although exact numbers prove 
difficult to verify,72 Miano builds a strong foundation for the need for 
reform. 
 
2. Wage Questions 
 
Further problems with LCAs arise when one tries to gather useful 
data on wages. Claims that H-1B workers are paid less are difficult to 
substantiate as wage data used to complete LCAs come from varying 
sources. Miano compared employer prevailing wages claims on LCAs to 
Occupational Employment Statistics (OES) data and concluded that the 
employer figures do not reflect actual prevailing wages.73 He 
acknowledges there are a number of problems in making these 
comparisons because employers do not disclose how they arrive at 
prevailing wage claims and many of their purported sources do not 
match the data.74 To illustrate this he refers to fiscal year 2004, where he 
found employers had used over seventy-five differ.ent sources to report 
prevailing wages.75 He found the lack of standardization for encoding of 
 71. CIS, supra note 54, at 10. 
 72. See infra Part III.B.2. 
 73. Miano 2006, supra note 20, at 9. 
 74. See id. at 6. 
 75. These included: Watson Wyatt, National Association of Colleges and Employers, 
Employer Wage Surveys, MIT Wage Survey, and Occupational Employment Statistics. CIS, supra 
note 54, at 8–9. 
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occupations in LCA data leads to imprecision in any attempted 
analysis.76
Despite these difficulties, based on his studies, Miano concluded that 
reported H-1B wages are significantly lower than U.S. workers’ wages. 
Specifically, he offers the following findings: 
 
• [W]ages listed for H-1B workers averaged about $13,000 less than 
the median U.S. wage for U.S. workers in the same occupation and 
state. 
• The wages for the majority of H-1B workers were in the bottom 
25th percentile of U.S. wages for occupation and state. 
• Wages for only 16% of H-1B workers were above the median U.S. 
wage for occupation and state.77 
 
Thus, Miano concludes, “prevailing wage provisions in the H-1B 
program do not result in H-1B workers actually being paid the prevailing 
wage.”78 In fact, his findings concluded that “prevailing wage claims 
[tend] to be even lower and more concentrated at the low end of the wage 
scale than H-1B wages”79 and that despite provisions in the law to 
prevent this from occurring, “the overwhelming majority of H-1B 
computer workers are actually paid wages substantially lower than 
Americans in equivalent positions.”80
Employers claim that H-1B visas bring in highly-skilled workers, but 
Miano argues the majority of the applications are for entry-level 
positions.81 He writes that many businesses use the H-1B program to 
import “workers at the very bottom of the wage scale,” not highly-skilled 
workers.82 He claims that “[t]he exhaustion of the H-1B quota may 
reflect employers’ interest in lowering labor costs or widespread fraud 
rather than an insufficient number of visas.”83
Despite Miano’s claims, Stuart Anderson states that no evidence 
exists that companies maintain two sets of pay scales (i.e., one for 
foreign-born and one for natives).84 Anderson contends that “[t]hose who 
would bar the door to foreign nationals being hired on H-1B visas . . . 
need to explain why it would be better if those individuals were hired in 
 76. Id. at 6. 
 77. Miano 2006, supra note 20, at 12. 
 78. CIS, supra note 54, at 7. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. See Miano 2006, supra note 20, at 1. 
 82. CIS, supra note 54, at 10. 
 83. Id. at 11. 
 84. Id.. 
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other nations by either U.S. or foreign companies.”85 Anderson argues 
that the OES data used by Miano is problematic when compared to 
wages on LCAs because: 
 
• the survey included forms of compensation such as bonuses which 
are prohibited on Labor Condition Applications; 
• the data reflected all workers at a firm, not just new hires; and 
• the OES estimates are not age-adjusted, which makes them higher 
than prevailing wages.86 
 
As further evidence of the unreliability of the Matloff study, Anderson 
states that simply averaging the minimum with the maximum salary on 
an LCA results in an average salary of $66,885—36% more than the 
average minimum salary on LCAs and 3% more than the OES salary 
cited by Miano.87 To substantiate his contentions, Anderson’s think tank, 
the NFAP, asked a law firm to gather data on H-1B cases 88 and found 
that the average actual wage paid to H-1B visa holders was more than 
twenty-two percent higher than the prevailing wage.89 Thus, Anderson’s 
findings appear to contradict those of Miano. 
However, in response to Anderson, Norm Matloff argues that 
Anderson’s underpayment data is calculated relative to the prevailing 
wage, which Matloff claims is actually below the market wage.90 Thus 
the figures cited by Anderson may not be as conclusive as the NFAP 
report seems to suggest. This article does not intend to imply that either 
of these figures is more valid than the other. However, this controversy 
demonstrates that the problems associated with exploring H-1B abuse 
become increasingly difficult as opposing contentions are supported by 
seemingly authoritative statistics. 
Anderson also cites research findings to counter allegations that 
employers want H-1B workers so that they can pay them less. He refers 
to a study, which found foreign-born and native professionals earn 
“virtually identical salaries in math and science fields.”91 Anderson also 
 85. Id. For an opposing viewpoint see Matloff, supra note 26, at 882–84 (discussing the 
problems that arise when trying to outsource computer-related positions overseas). 
 86. Id. at 9–10. 
 87. Anderson states that on an LCA, employers often list the minimum and the maximum 
salary they intend to pay and that this represents a conservative estimate because on forms where the 
maximum was blank he assumed the maximum was equal to the minimum. Id. at 10. 
 88. Id. at 9. Anderson does not disclose what firm did this or any of the details regarding its 
methodology, but only refers to “a respected law firm” randomly selecting one hundred cases. Id. 
 89. Id. He says this was not meant to show that actual wages are always twenty-two percent 
higher than the prevailing wage data, but to show that utilizing prevailing wage data is unreliable. 
 90. E-NEWSLETTER, supra note 63. 
 91. CIS, supra note 54, at 5 
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cites to National Science Foundation (NSF) data, which “indicate[s] that 
foreign-born professionals actually earn more than their native 
counterparts when controlled for age and the year . . . [their] degree is 
earned.”92
However, as Norm Matloff points out, these studies analyzed the 
salaries of foreign-born workers and did not address specific claims of 
H-1B underpayment.93 Matloff agrees with Anderson’s interpretation of 
the data in these studies—that foreign-born and native professionals earn 
roughly equivalent salaries, but Matloff argues that “H-1Bs comprise 
only a small percentage of the foreign-born category.” According to 
Matloff, “foreign-born” also includes anyone who immigrated to the 
United States as a child. Of course, this does not necessarily mean that 
H-1B visa holders are not paid equivalent salaries, but simply 
Anderson’s arguments do not directly respond to Miano’s claims of 
underpayment for H-1B workers. 
Anderson also argues that the relatively few instances of 
enforcement and fines resulting from H-1B underpayment indicate that 
abuse is not widespread.94 He found that “[b]etween 1992 and 2004 . . . 
the average amount of back wages owed to an H-1B employee was 
$5,919” and only eleven percent of all violations were found to be 
willful.95 If indeed enforcement can serve as a reliable indicator of the 
amount of abuse, then it would seem that the problems of abuse are quite 
limited. 
Based on these conflicting contentions, it is difficult to determine 
whether there is indeed underpayment of H-1B workers. Certainly a 
standard wage source used in all LCAs would help.96 Because further 
information appears necessary to determine exactly what sort of wage 
discrepancies exist, this Article instead turns to a more readily 
identifiable problem in the next section. 
 
3. Bodyshops: a Fundamental Problem. 
 
Bodyshopping occurs when companies bring H-1B visa workers into 
the U.S. and then contract the workers out to other companies on a work-
for-hire basis. By contracting the visa holders, rather than hiring them, 
the company can pay the H-1B visa holders lower wages than it would 
 92. Id. 
 93. E-NEWSLETTER, supra note 63. 
 94. NFAP BRIEF, supra note 66 at 6. 
 95. Id. at 6. 
 96. Miano makes this very suggestion. See Miano 2006, supra note 20, at 19–20. 
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pay employees without violating statutory equal-pay requirement.97  A 
bodyshop allows the employer to say it never hired any H-1B workers, 
and the bodyshop can in turn say it never fired any Americans.98 As 
Miano describes it, bodyshops are “a low cost alternative to U.S. 
workers.”99 According to Miano, bodyshops sponsor workers without 
actual assignments and then “circulate[s] lists of available H-1B workers 
to employers.”100
Upon learning about bodyshops, the question naturally arises as to 
what these companies are. Miano claims, “[f]ew H-1B visas for 
programmers are going to U.S. technology leaders.”101 According to his 
testimony, all of the top twenty users of H-1B visas, with one exception, 
are what Miano labels as “H-1B bodyshopp[ers]” or “offshoring 
industries.”102 He contends that under the current system the true purpose 
of the H-1B visa program appears to be nothing more than a way to 
“provide a pool of workers for bodyshops to supply to other companies 
and to expedite the ‘offshoring’ of U.S. technology jobs.”103
Another way Miano argues bodyshopping undermines protections in 
the system is the illegal practice of “benching,” where employers pay a 
reduced wage or nothing while the worker has no work, which he claims 
is a common practice.104 According to Miano, up to twenty percent of H-
1B workers in bodyshops are seeking employment.105
Anderson does not mention the problem of bodyshopping in his 
report, but he does argue that the cost of processing fees also makes it 
unlikely that employers will look to H-1B workers for cheap labor.106 
Anderson relates employers must not only pay H-1B professionals the 
same wages as similar individuals, but the company must also pay 
$5,910 in fees as well as other in-house human resources costs and 
potentially $10,000 associated with sponsoring a party for a green 
card.107 Although Anderson responds to arguments about H-1B policies 
 97. See CIS, supra note 54, at 4. 
 98. See id. Bodyshops would presumably be considered H-1B dependent. See supra notes 
50–51 and accompanying text. 
 99. See CIS, supra note 54, at 4. Miano asserts that the H-1B program “allows [for] the direct 
replacement of Americans with lower-paid guestworkers.” Miano 2006, supra note 20, at 17. 
 100. See CIS, supra note 54, at 4. 
 101. Id. at 8. 
 102. Id. at 9. The one exception he notes is Oracle. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 17. 
 105. Id. Augmenting this problem is the situation where prevailing wages are certified for one 
location, but the worker is located elsewhere, making it impossible to verify where H-1B workers 
are located. Id. 
 106. Id. at 6–7. 
 107. Id. at 7. 
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generally, bodyshopping circumvents his contentions because the 
companies who hire the visa holders on a contractual basis are not the 
ones who deal with the fees and associated difficulties of sponsoring the 
visa holders, nor do they submit LCAs attesting that the visa holders will 
be paid at the contracting company’s wage scale.108
In summary, bodyshops frustrates both the aims of the U.S. 
immigration system, namely protecting U.S. labor and promoting the 
employment of foreign workers in the U.S.109 Labor interests are 
damaged when bodyshops place H-1B workers “in direct competition 
with U.S. workers seeking similar jobs.”110 Additionally, because 
bodyshops claim a large number of the visas each year, other workers 
who would potentially provide needed skills to the U.S. economy are 
unable to obtain visas. Thus, while often times a burden on one of the 
policy aims benefits the other, 111 bodyshopping results in a detriment to 
both aims of the immigration system. 
 
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTION: STATUTORY LANGUAGE TO ELIMINATE 
BODYSHOPPING 
 
The H-1B visa is just one component of the United States’ 
immigration policy. Recently, Congress voted to reform a similar 
scheme, the L-1 visa program.112 The L-1 visa shares much in common 
with the H-1B visa, both good and bad. Because of the many parallels 
between the two visa programs, the statutory solution to L-1 
bodyshopping also provides an ideal model for reforming the current H-
1B system. 
The L-category visa has existed since the 1970s, when the 
Immigration and Nationality Act was amended, but it was overhauled by 
the Immigration Act of 1990,113 the same act that created the H-1B 
 108. Matloff also responds to this argument, stating that $6,000 in legal fees are quickly 
recovered by a company who underpays a visa holder $15,000 annually. See E-NEWSLETTER, supra 
note 63. 
 109. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
 110. See CIS, supra note 54, at 4. 
 111. Anderson writes, “It is a dim view of humanity–and a misreading of the nation’s 
economy–to assume that opportunity for some must mean misery for others.” NFAP Brief, supra 
note 66 at 12. The above statement does not intend to claim immigration is a zero-sum game, but to 
state that the two aims of the immigration policy often contradict one another. 
 112. The L-1 Visa Reform Act of 2004 became law in December 2004 as part of the Omnibus 
Appropriations Act for fiscal year 2005. See Press Release, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 
Services, USCIS To Implement L-1 Visa Reform Act of 2004 (December 8, 2004). 
 113. Office of Inspector General, Department of Homeland Security, Review of 
Vulnerabilities and Potential Abuses of the L-1 Visa Program, OIG-06-22, Jan. 2006, at 6, available 
at http://www.dhs.gov/xoig/assets/katovrsght/OIG_06-22_Jan06.pdf [hereinafter L-1 Visa Review]. 
    
170 BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 21 
 
visa.114 The visa differs from the H-1B, in that the L-1 requires the visa 
applicant to be a current employee of the sponsoring company.115 The L-
1 visa allows a foreign worker employed by an overseas company to 
enter the country for one year, “in order to continue to render his services 
to the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a capacity that 
is managerial, executive, or involves specialized knowledge.”116 An H-
1B applicant, in contrast, is hired by the sponsoring company to work in 
the U.S. once the visa has been approved.117 Like the H-1B visa, the L-1 
visa is mostly used for computer and IT positions and virtually all 
applications are approved.118 Further, both programs have been criticized 
for allowing bodyshopping to negatively influence American 
employment.119
L-1 visa holders represent just a small percentage of temporary 
workers in the United States technology industry.120 For example, during 
fiscal year 2002, the ratio of H-1B visa holders to L-1B workers was 
twenty to one.121 Even though L-1 visas represent a fraction of all foreign 
tech workers, Congress amended the L-1 visa scheme to prevent 
bodyshopping. Faced with the rise of foreign companies in the United 
States and concerns of transplanted foreign competitors forcing 
American workers out of their jobs, Congress added the following 
language to the text of the Immigration and Nationality Act: 
 
(F) An alien who will serve in a capacity involving specialized 
knowledge with respect to an employer for purposes of section 
101(a)(15)(L) and will be stationed primarily at the worksite of an 
employer other than the petitioning employer or its affiliate, subsidiary, 
or parent shall not be eligible for classification under section 
101(a)(15)(L) if— 
(i) the alien will be controlled and supervised principally by such 
unaffiliated employer; or 
 114. See supra Part II.A. 
 115. L-1 Visa Review, supra note 122, at 3. 
 116. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(15)(L) (2006). See also Ephraim Schwartz, Homeland Security 
Probes L-1 Visa Abuses: Office of the Inspector General Finds Significant Flaws in Overseas Hiring 
Program, INFOWORLD.COM, Mar. 21, 2006, http://www.infoworld.com/ article/06/03/21/76507_13O 
Preality_1.html. 
 117. See supra Part II.B. 
 118. Schwartz, supra note 125. The L-1 is sometimes called the “The Computer Visa” as 
ninety percent of the visas go to people in computer and information technology positions. Id. 
 119. Id. (discussing problems with L-1 visa bodyshopping). For a discussion of H-1B 
bodyshopping see supra Part III.B.3. 
 120. L-1 Visa Review, supra note 122, at 12–13. 
 121. At the peak year of L-1 visas, the ratio of H-1B visa holders to L-1 visa holders was still 
ten to one. Id. at 13. 
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(ii) the placement of the alien at the worksite of the unaffiliated 
employer is essentially an arrangement to provide labor for hire for the 
unaffiliated employer, rather than a placement in connection with the 
provision of a product or service for which specialized knowledge 
specific to the petitioning employer is necessary. 
8 U.S.C. § 1184(c)(2)(F). 
 
Thus, under the current reform, workers entering the United States 
on an L-1 visa must remain employed by the sponsoring company and 
cannot be contracted out to other companies. With the addition of this 
language, Congress eliminated the L-1 bodyshopping loophole. 
A similar solution could be applied to the H-1B program. Language 
could be added to the statute which would forbid the placement of H-1B 
workers in labor for hire arrangements with unaffiliated employers. Thus 
employers could not abuse the system by contracting out work to H-1B 
bodyshops at lower wages. Such an amendment would not necessarily 
preclude H-1B workers from changing employers. If another company 
would be willing to sponsor the H-1B worker, then the prospective 
employer could petition for a transfer. The new employer would be 
required to meet the same standards for employment. 
Banning the practice of bodyshopping will result in several important 
changes. First, this will free up a large percentage of the visas, as 
bodyshops already receive most of the visas.122 As always, companies 
will be free to hire H-1B workers if they are willing to pay them the 
same as U.S. workers. By eliminating bodyshops, employers will no 
longer be able to cut costs by contracting foreign visa holders to perform 
jobs that American workers would otherwise do. This will also increase 
the opportunity for “the world’s best and brightest” to come to the U.S., 
who may have otherwise avoided the quickly-exhausted and uncertain 
application process. 
This statutory solution proposed by this Article does not address the 
question of whether Congress should raise the H-1B cap, nor does the 
Article need to answer this dilemma. Once Congress bans bodyshopping, 
and if it becomes apparent that there is not a labor shortage, employers 
will not have a cheap-labor incentive to motivate them to go through the 
hassle and additional expense of hiring foreign workers. As a result, 
employers may even have an incentive to provide additional training to 
U.S. workers. On the other hand, if the labor shortage is as severe as 
industry executives insist, then H-1B workers will continue to fill a 
 122. See supra text accompanying notes 110–12. 
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necessary role at the levels currently allowed by statute.123 Congress can 
then address the question of increasing the annual visa cap, without the 
pressure from those motivated by the possibility of exploiting cheaper 
labor through bodyshopping. 
Visa holders, by the very nature of their situation as workers 
dependent upon employers for the right to remain in the country—either 
permanently or temporarily—remain less likely to protest against unfair 
working conditions than their counterparts with permanent resident 
status.124 It seems likely that employers would attempt to cut corners by 
demanding more of visa holders than permanent residents. The next 
section addresses the concern that eliminating bodyshops further limits 
mobility and potentially subjects visa holders to increased abuse. 
 
V.  PROTECTING FOREIGN WORKERS 
 
Sponsoring employers recognize that H-1B workers are dependant 
on employment to stay in the country.125 As a result, H-1B workers are 
less likely to assert their rights or reject unreasonable assignments.126 
Because foreign workers are more vulnerable, they are much more likely 
to be subjected to abuse by employers. Much has been written 
concerning the potential abuses facing H-1B visa holders, 127 and 
immigrant workers in general.128
One could claim that the above mentioned reform129 would further 
limit the mobility of foreign workers. Such limitations could discourage 
potential H-1B applicants from working in America, which would make 
labor unions happy, but also presents the threat of keeping the “world’s 
best and brightest” from considering the U.S. Many have suggested that 
 123. Miano adopts a similar view. See Miano 2006, supra note 20 at 19 He argues the fact that 
some employers are reaching the quota does not mean that the government should raise the quotae 
quota should be raised. He claims if Congress would fix the H-1B program to eliminate loopholes, 
“there would be plenty of visas available for U.S. technology companies.” Id. at 20. 
 124. See E-NEWSLETTER, supra note 63 (“The H-1B has the legal right to change employers, 
but dare not do so, since that would mean starting the green card process all over again from 
scratch.”). 
 125. Matloff refers to this problem as “de facto indentured servitude.” Matloff, supra note 26, 
at 864–69. 
 126. See e.g., id. at 880–81 (presenting anecdotal evidence of H-1B workers working longer 
hours without extra pay). A 2003 Government Accountability Office (GAO) study found that some 
employers hire H-1B workers because they accept lower salaries than similarly qualified U.S. 
workers. See E-NEWSLETTER, supra note 63. 
 127. For further examples of abuse of the program see Leah Phelps Carpenter, The Status of 
the H-1B Visa in These Conflicting Times, 10 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 553,576–85 (2003). 
 128. See, e.g., Maire-Claire Belleau, Mail-order Brides in a Global World, 67 ALB. L. REV. 
595 (2003). 
 129. Supra Part IV. 
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refusing to liberalize the H-1B program would send potential workers to 
other countries, such as Canada, 130 which have opened their borders to 
high-skilled foreign workers. Increased limitations on the H-1B program 
could cost the United States even more of the world’s great minds. 
However, one needs to recognize that Congress has already enacted 
statutory provisions which provide foreign workers with protection 
against aggressive employers. The current law helps level the playing 
field by protecting the rights of these foreign workers. The case of 
Tambay v. Peer,131 provides an example of these protections in action. 
Dr. Nishin Tambay was an Indian citizen who began working as a 
licensed physician for Meeta D. Peer, M.D., P.C.132 To satisfy 
requirements for his visa,133 Dr. Tambay was required to work forty 
hours per week in approved Medically Under-served Areas (MUAs).134 
At the time of hiring, Peer told Dr. Tambay that there would be sufficient 
work for him to meet the weekly hour  requirement at the approved 
locations.135 Peer hired Dr. Tambay on a five-year contract for a salary in 
excess of $100,000 with a ten percent raise for each completed year.136 
The employment contract provided that Peer would have sole discretion 
over Tambay’s schedule, that Tambay would work forty hours per week, 
and that Tambay could be fired for cause with twenty-four hours written 
notice.137
Peer obtained government approval for Dr. Tambay to work at its 
facilities as part of Dr. Tambay’s forty hour requirement, but failed to 
complete the approval process for other locations.138 Dr. Tambay’s daily 
schedule involved being on call for Peer and performing rounds at 
several hospitals and medical facilities,139 but not all of the locations to 
which Peer assigned Dr. Tambay were approved MUAs.140 In October 
2001, after speaking with an immigration attorney about becoming a 
U.S. citizen, Dr. Tambay became concerned as to whether his work 
 130. For a discussion contrasting the United States’ immigration policy with that of Canada 
see Looking to the North, supra note 19. For a broad comparison of U.S. and Canadian immigration 
policies see generally, Peter H. Schuck, Immigration at the Turn of the New Century, 33 CASE W. 
RES J. INT’L L. 1 (2001). 
 131. No. 03-4499, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9300 (E.D. Pa. May 17, 2005). 
 132. Id. at *1–2. 
 133. Dr. Tambay began with a J-1 visa, but successfully petitioned INS for an H-1B visa in 
order to avoid returning to India for his residency. Id. at *4, *8. 
 134. Id. at *6. 
 135. Id. at *7. 
 136. Id. at *21. 
 137. Id. at *6–7. 
 138. Id. at *8–9. 
 139. Id. at *9. 
 140. Id. 
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schedule satisfied the visa requirements.141 On at least two occasions, Dr. 
Tambay consulted the government administrator responsible for his 
program, who told him that Peer must contact her to address his 
concerns.142
In November 2001, Dr. Tambay became involved in an argument 
with Peer concerning his billing requirements, during which Peer told 
Tambay not to come back to work.143 The day after the altercation, Peer 
told Tambay, “It’s too late, it’s over. You’re fired. Get out of the 
office.”144 Through an attorney Tambay asserted that he was still willing 
to work, that he was fired without cause or written notice, and he 
demanded to be reinstated.145 Peer refused, and Tambay filed a complaint 
in district court.146 Meanwhile, the government administrator had 
repeatedly tried to contact Peer, but her messages were never returned.147
Over the ensuing months, negotiations between Peer, Tambay, and 
the government administrator led to the determination that Tambay 
should continue to work for Peer even though Tambay could not comply 
with the hourly requirement until approval for other locations was 
reached.148 After reaching this decision, Tambay was told by staff at Peer 
PC that he could not work there.149 Eventually, Dr. Tambay was able to 
find employment in Cleveland, where he was able to satisfy the weekly 
hour requirement.150
Although these facts alone would provide ample evidence of 
mistreatment of an H-1B employee, as the district court action 
progressed, more abuses came to the surface. Over the course of his 
employment, it was discovered that Peer also withheld $134,035.79 of 
Dr. Tambay’s salary.151 Dr. Tambay’s story would likely cause a 
potential H-1B candidate to hesitate before undertaking employment in 
the United States. However, the district court did not allow these abuses 
to take place. As a result of the Peers’ violations of the employment 
contract, the District Court awarded Dr. Tambay over $200,000 in 
 141. Id. at *11. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at *13. 
 144. Id. at *14. In its pleadings, Peer claimed that Dr. Tambay said “I quit” during the course 
of the argument that led to his leaving, but notably the district court found this lacked credibility as 
“Dr. Tambay needed to continue his employment to maintain his immigration status and stay in the 
United States.” Id. at *13 n.5. 
 145. Id. at *14. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at *17. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at *18. 
 150. Id. at *19–20. 
 151. Id. at *22 
    
153] THE CONTINUED NEED FOR H-1B REFORM 175 
 
damages plus attorneys fees.152
Other actions against abusive employers have also proven successful. 
An example of this can be seen in the newly decided case of Chellen v. 
John Pickle Co.153 As a result of a disturbing, and hopefully rare, 
situation the district court awarded over $1.2 million in damages to a 
group of fifty-two Indian high-skilled workers who paid substantial fees 
to enter the U.S. in the hope of earning lawful wages working for a parts 
manufacturer in the oil industry154 only upon arrival to be locked in a 
compound and forced to live in a warehouse. Among the workers were 
skilled welders, who were only paid $1.00 to $3.17 an hour, while non-
Indian employees earned $14.00 per hour for comparable work at the 
same factory.155 Even though the workers prevailed, with stories like this, 
the United States obviously has a long way to go to establish itself as a 
nation interested in protecting vulnerable immigrant groups. 
This year, further steps toward fighting H-1B abuse have been taken 
in court. Recently an action was commenced in California, where an 
Indian H-1B worker sued Tata International, one of the largest 
bodyshopping corporations in the United States, for lost wages as a result 
of failing to pay the contracted gross salary, implementing an illegal 
vacation policy, and forcing him and other H-1B visa holders to sign 
over their state and federal employment tax refund checks to the 
company.156 The outcome of this action is still pending. 
These cases demonstrate that the current statutory system has the 
potential to protect visa holders from abuse. Thus, once bodyshopping is 
eliminated, the major problems with the H-1B system become issues of 
enforcement157 and information,158 not necessarily further statutory 
 152. See id. at *28–29. The Judge declined to award Dr. Tambay twenty-five percent in 
liquidated damages as he found there was “a good faith contest or dispute” as to the amount owed 
Dr. Tambay. Id. at *26. 
 153. 446 F. Supp. 2d 1247 (2006). See also Leah Phelps Carpenter, The Status of the H-1B 
Visa in These Conflicting Times, 10 TULSA J. COMP & INT’L L. 553, 582 (2003) (discussing the 
factual background of the then recently filed case). A description of the 71 page decision can be 
found at U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Judge Orders John Pickle Co. To Pay 
$1.24 Million to 52 Foreign Workers in “Human Trafficking” Case, http://www.eeoc.gov/press/5-
26-06.html. 
 154. American Society for Industrial Security, Discrimination, John Pickle Company, Inc, 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 
 155. Pickle threatened to deport two of the men after they sneaked out of the compound, 
slipping past the armed guard and under a barbed wire fence, on Thanksgiving. 
 156. Vedachalam v. Tata Am. Int’l Corp., No. 06-0963, 1, 1–2 (N.D. Cal. filed Feb. 2006). 
 157. Matloff rejects the idea that enforcement is the main problem with the current system. E-
NEWSLETTER, supra note 63 (“As I’ve said many times, the problem of underpayment of H-1Bs is 
NOT an enforcement issue. The problem is in the law itself, not in the enforcement of it.”). 
 158. If H-1B workers are informed of their rights upon obtaining a visa, they will be much 
more likely to assert them. Outreach programs, such as those already provided by the Office of 
Special Counsel for Unfair Immigration-Related Employment Practices in the Civil Rights Division 
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reform. 
Further, according to Stuart Anderson, H-1B visa holders already 
enjoy a great deal of mobility, despite claims to the contrary.159 In 
support of this idea, he reports that “[a] number of S&P 500 companies 
related that the majority of their H-1B hires first worked for other 
employers.”160 Additionally, Anderson states that during 2003 more H-
1B applications were approved for “continuing” employment than for 
initial employment, and “anecdotal evidence indicates that most 
‘continuing’ employment involves an H-1B visa holder changing to a 
new employer.”161 He argues that if H-1B holders lack mobility out of a 
fear that “they will lose their place in the queue for labor certification 
and permanent residence,” then the solution is not to change the H-1B 
program but rather to make changes to the labor certification and 
residence application processes.162
Successes such as that of Dr. Tambay show that employers can be 
stopped from abusing worker’s rights in the United States. Removing 
bodyshopping from the system will promote a setting that is fairer to all 
workers: both visa holders and U.S. citizens alike. Once the system 
reflects the needs of U.S. companies and gives proper respect to the 
rights of workers, Congress can then more accurately determine whether 
to increase the cap on H-1B visas. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
The need for H-1B visa reform is critical to immigration reform. The 
H-1B program brings talent to the U.S. that would otherwise work in 
other countries. Although the current system has measures to prevent 
employers from exploiting potentially cheaper labor resources, flaws 
exist that make the program less desirable than what it could otherwise 
be. Determining how many visas to issue will always remain a hotly-
contested matter. What can be agreed upon, however, is that 
bodyshopping harms both U.S. and foreign workers. By eliminating 
bodyshopping, the H-1B program can protect American jobs. At the 
same time the nation must assure foreign workers’ rights, thus continuing 
to make the United States a desirable location for the “world’s best and 
of the U.S. Department of Justice, would help in this regard. See e.g., An Overview of the Office of 
Special Counsel for Immigration-Related Unfair Employment Practices, http://www.usdoj.gov/crt 
/osc/htm/WebOverview2005.htm (last visited December 1, 2006). 
 159. NFAP BRIEF, supra note 66 at 8. 
 160. Anderson does not cite a source for this information. Id. 
 161. Anderson does not indicate a source for this anecdotal evidence. Id. 
 162. Anderson claims “Major U.S. employers have supported such reforms,” but they have not 
survived congressional negotiations. Id. 
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brightest.” Statutory reform to eliminate H-1B bodyshopping will thus 
enable the U.S. to meet both aims of its immigration program, “the 
employment of non-citizen workers by U.S. employers and [the 
protection of] U.S. labor from competition by non-citizen workers.”163
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